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IN THE SUPREME CO,URT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
.JOSljJPH E. NELSON,
Plaintiff,

vs.

Case No.

CL.YD E~ L. MILLER, as Secretary
of State of the State of Utah,

12258

Defendant.

PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF'
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
By minute entry dated October 9, 1970, this Court
has, upon hearing the parties arguments in this action,
onlered that the plaintiff's name be placed upon the
Lallot for possible election on November 3, 1970. Therefore, in the pres011t posture of this litigation, no issue
is 1·aise<l concerning the denial by the defendant Secrdm·~, of State of plaintiff's request to stand for election. ~~eeonli11gly, we ha,·e limited our decision below to
those issue directlv
. related to the constitutionality. of
tl1(• mandatory retirement statute.
In plaintiff's l\Iemorandum two assertions were
made concerning the constitutionality of Sec. 49-7-1.1.
1
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The first argument <lemo11strated that the statute in question is inconsistent with both the terms and the intent of
the constitutional amendment authorizing the enactment
of a system of mandatory retirement of judicial personnel. Secondly, it was argued that the present statute
contravenes other constitutional provisions of Article
VIII which establish the requirements to be met in the
election to, and occupancy of, judicial office in this state.
The requisite standards of age, knowledge and character
are explicitly defined in Article VIII. Consequently thesr
standards can be neither augmented nor eroded by leg-islative direction. Therefore, even if the statute under
examination could be considered apart from the underlying constitutional amendment, it remains invalid because
of inconsistency with independent constitutional requirements.
In the discussion below, we have set our additional
considerations which also point to the validity of each
of these conclusion.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
SECTION 49-7-1.1 IS BEYOND THE
SCOPE OF ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 28
AND IS THEREFORE I~V ALID.
In the :Memorandum previously submitted, it wa~
established that no reasonable interpretation of the
above cited amendment could support the scheme of mandatory retirement emobdied in Section 49-7-1.l. To up2
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ltold the validity of the statute under the amendment
would necessarily render the latter provision meaningless. In addition to this textual deficiency, the inconsistency of the statute, when compared to the amendment,
i;;; demonstrated by equally compelling practical considerations.
As the statute in question was conceived by the legislature, retirement at a given age is compulsory, even if
the particular judge being retired is obviously still qualified to serve. Under a supplementary provision of the
.J u<lges' Retirement Act, Section 49-7 -5. 7, such a judge
could be called back to serve either as a district judge or
upon the Supreme Court. Not only does this provision
indicate legislative recognition of the actual intent of
the amendment, i.e. service according to ability; it also
creates the statutory possibility of lifetime tenure of
judicial persom1el, uneffected and uninterrupted by
election, age or lack of capacity. When a judge is retired
under Section 49-7-1.1, then another must be duly nomi11atecl and elected to fill the vacancy. After such an
election, the retired juclge has no constitutionally valid
l'laim or authority for continued judicial service. 1 Yet
under the provisions of Section 49-7-5.7, he may be called upon to serve and receive full pay for such service,
whirh may extend for any period deemed appropriate
hy the presiding judge of the Supreme Court.
Like the statutory provision at issue, Subsection
.). I was adopted wholesale from equivalent federal legis'See infra, pp. 5-6.
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I
la ti on.~ The only way Subsections 1.1 and 5.7 and Section 28 of Article VIII can be meaningfully reconciled
is to ascribe to each of them the meaning clearly apparent from the text of the amendment and implicit in
the federal statutory program. Service as a function of
demonstrated capacity is the principle underlying both
the federal legislation and the state constitutional amern1ment. The federal statute provides for a system of permissive retirement; the age limits apply only to determine qualification for retirement at full pay. The operative provisions of both the ameuclment to the state constitution and the statute allowing continuing service are
premised on a similar principle of limiting service only
in the face of objective findings of actual inability to
serve. Only when Subsection 1.1 is similarly construed,
can it stand consistently with the other sections of the
retirement statute, ancl, as we have argued, with the
amendment itself. If retirement or removal under that
provision were premised upon some finding of deficient
conduct - as the amendment clearly directs - then continued service upon a "case hy case" basis would not
be possible for any judge so retired since the standard
for service under both Subsection 1.1 and 5.7 would be
the same, namely, physical and mental ability. Accordingly, disqualification under one would necessarily indicate disqualification under the other and therefore, de
facto lifetime tenure nuder the latter provisions would
not be possible.
~see

28 U.S.C.A. §294.

4
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POINT II
THE AGE Lnrrrs IMPOSED BY SECTION 49-7-1.1 CONTRAVENE THE CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE OF UNIFORMITY
AS REQUIRED BY ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 28.
The mandate of Article VIII, Section 28, requires
the legislature to establish, "uniform standards for
mandatory retirement." (emphasis added) The concept
of uniformity, as applied to classes within a group, rer1uires that distinctions should not be of capricious or
arbitrary nature and that they ha\'e a rational basis. 3 In
addition, any differences between classes within a group
should be both practical and substantial and not merely
represent a factitious equality.'
In State r. Packard, 250 P.2d 561, (Utah 1952),
ibis court held that,
''a statute is unconstitutional, as being unreasonably discriminatory, if it differentiates between
such classes without any reasonable basis bearing
on purpose sought to be accomplished by the
statute." 259 P.2d at 556.
It is the plaintiff's position that no such reasonable
lJasis exists to allow this court to determine that ~49-7-1.1
is constitutional. The distinction contained in that pro\'ision allows only for factitious equality which is disC'riminatorv and therefore, violative of the equal pro.'
'
trction clause of the 14th Amendment of the Constitution
of the United States.
"16 Am. Jur. 2d §498.
§499.

4 ld.,
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On a practical basis, plaintiff's position is further
supported by the fact that district court judges are allowed to serve on the Supreme Court by invitation when
the need arises. If a district judge is qualified to serve
as a member of the :Supreme Court prior to age 70, what
reasonable basis can disqualify him from serving in the
same capacity upon attaining age 70 and not disqualify
a Supreme Court judge at age 70 for the same reasons.

POINT III
THE REMOVAL OR DISQUALIFICATION OF AN ELECTED JUDGE UNDER
THE AUTHORITY OF SECTION 49-7-1.1
CON"TRAVENES THE CONSTITUTIONALLY DEFINED REQUIREMENTS AND PROCEDURES FOR ELECTION TO AND OCCUp ANY OF JUDICIAL OFFICE.
In oral argument, the case of Boughton u. Price, 35
P.2d 775, (Ida. 1950), was cited by <lefendant as authority for the proposition that where a constitution sets out
certain minimal requirements for eligibility for constitutional office, it is ~within the power of the legislature
to aff ectin~ly supplement these minimal qualifications.
HoweYer, the general rule in this regard is that where
a stat<:> eonstitution lavs dovvn specific eligibility requiremc11ts for a particular office, such constitutional sp<:>cification is exclusiv<:>, ancl absent some express grant of
authority, the legislature is ~without po'ser to require additional or different qualifications. Whitney L'. Boli11,
330 P.2d 1003, (Ariz. 1938); TY all ace r. Superior Court,
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-298 P.2d 69 (Cal. 1956) ; State ex. rel. Chapman v. Appli11g, 348 P.2d 759, (Ore. 1960); And See Anno., A.L.R.2d
171. Thus in State ex. rel. Stain v. Christensen., 35 P.2d
775, (Utah 1934), this court recognized that,
There is eminent authority and good reason
to support the doctrine that when a constitution
prescribes eligibility for an office, its declarations
are conclusive of the whole matter whether the
language used is affirmative or negative in form.
35 P.2d at 780.
The court went on to hold that this principle could not
be applied to invalidate a statute requiring the state
treasurer to undertake a bond as a condition for holding
office since such a requirement was sufficiently "foreign
to the subject matter of eligibility for office.'' The instant statute deals explicitly with eligibility for office
and therefore, under the principle established by the
above cited case, is explicitly invalid.
Even if it were determined that Sec. 49-7-1.1 was
not, standing alone, an impermissible addition to the
stated constitutional requirements for judicial office,
it cannot be considered apart from the constitutional
amendment it seeks to implement. When its departure
from the scope of that amendment is added to its authorized modification of the stated requirements for judicial
office, the unconstitutionality of the provision seems
plainly evident. Indeed, each constitutional defect aggravates the severity of the other.
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POINT IV
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, SECTION
49-7-1.1 IS STATE ACTION \VHICH VIOLATES THE FOURTEENTH AJ\IENDl\IENT
OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.
Section 1 of Amendment XIV of the Constitution of
the United States provides as follows:
''All persons born or naturalized in the United
States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce
an:v law which shall a bridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of lmv; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the law.''
Holding an elective office is a privilege. DepriYing
one of the right to hold elective office by reason of maximum age alone is an unreasonable deprivation of this
privilege, and violative of tlw rn·evionsly quoted section
of the l~nited States Constitution.
The same constitutional section states that a State
may not deprive any person of life, libert~-, or proper!~',
without due process of la\L The loss of the right to work,
merely by reason of maximum age <•lone, is loss of a

8
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I

I

property right which is protected by the above mentioned
eo11stitutional provision. The Utah Constitution also
prohihits deprivation of life, liberty, or property without
due process of la\1', whe11 it provides in Article 1, Section 7,
"No person shall he deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law.''
The right to work, the right to engage in gainful
employment, and the right to receive compensation for
one's work, are essentially property rights, McGrew v.
l11rl11sfrial Commission, 85 P.2d 608, (Utah 1938).
The above mentioned constitutional provision forbids a State from denying any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. Traditionally,
this amendment prohibits discrimination by reason of
race, creed, or color. It may be reasonable for the State,
through legislative action, to set standards for office
holders (for example, that a Judge must be an attorney
admitted to practice in the State), but to establish a
maximum age limit as the sole basis of disqualification
to hold office is unreasonable and denies the equal proh•ction guaranteed by the United States Constitution.

9
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CONCLUSION
On the basis of all of the foregoing propositions,
plaintiff respectfully urges that Section 49-7-1.1 be declared unconstitutional.
Dated this 26th day of October, 1970.
Dennis F. Olsen,
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall &
McCarthy
141 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Richard JU. Taylor
275 North Main Street
Spanish Fork, Utah
Paul H. Liapis,
Gustin & Gustin
1610 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Jackson B. Howard
120 East 300 North
Provo, Utah
Attorneys for Plaintiff.

10
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

